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Abstract
Official development finance from China has risen tremendously in the past two decades across the
globe, including in the world’s poorest continent, Africa. How has this sudden increase in development
resources affected the two major multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the region, the World Bank
and the African Development Bank (AfDB)? Onemight expect that the MDBs—often described as tools to
exert the influence of wealthy western countries—might compete with China to maintain their relevance
and influence in Africa. This study undertakes a combination of statistical tests and in-depth interviews
with government officials in three recipient countries to see if this is the case, both in terms of overall
finance levels as well as in the sectoral distribution of projects. The results indicate that total MDB finance
levels by country change little over time regardless of Chinese activity. The same is true for funding levels
of traditional bilateral donors. The sectoral allocation of concessional lending does not show any respon-
siveness either. In contrast, shifts in funding levels overall and in sector allocation can be observed for
non-concessional countries; the latter, however, represent only a small minority among the recipients of
Chinese finance. Overall, the study suggests that while China’s role in African development finance is
indeed substantial and growing, it has not had the “game changing” impact on traditional development
finance as popular perception might lead one to believe. Things may change, however, once more re-
cipient countries develop economically and move into the non-concessional category.
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1. Introduction 
 
Understanding the role played by China in international development finance is a topic of increasing 
interest among policy makers and academics alike. The issue has become even more acute as many 
OECD countries face foreign aid budget retrenchments and the U.S. steps back from global 
engagement under the Trump administration. In parallel, China has become more confident of its role, 
not only continuing to expand its bilateral overseas finance through its policy banks like China Ex-Im and 
China Development Bank, but now setting up brand new multilateral institutions like the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB). In this context, it is 
unsurprising that some commentators see China replacing the U.S. as a global financial leader 
(Gallagher, 2017).  
 
Nowhere is the rise of China’s global influence in development finance more controversial than in Africa. 
The volumes of Chinese money pouring into Africa are extremely impressive, an estimated $97 billion 
in real terms1 between 2000 and 2014 according to AidData (2017)2 and about $12 billion per year since 
2010. The China Ex-Im Bank alone intends to have invested a total of over $1 trillion to Africa by 2025 
(Sun, 2014). Official Chinese development finance has rapidly grown in recent years, and is now one of 
the most important sources of finance in Africa (Figure 1). Chinese finance now rivals the resources 
provided by multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank (AfDB), as well as major traditional donor countries, namely the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Chinese yearly finance commitments are now on a par with—and in some recent years substantially 
exceeded—finance by the U.S., formerly the largest bilateral donor in Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 This paper takes AidData’s nominal figures for China financing to Africa, and adjusts them (along with all other financing data 
used, including from DAC and the MDBs) for inflation with the U.S. Consumer Price Index for 2013. Thus, the numbers differ 
somewhat from AidData’s aggregate numbers, which are adjusted with the GDP deflator. AidData reports total Chinese official 
flows to Africa at US$121 billion for the 2000-2014 period. 
2 US$86.3 billion, according to Bräutigam and Hwang (2016), based on the SAIS-CARI database.  
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Figure 1. Cumulative development finance commitments to Africa, 2000-2014 
 
Sources: China from AidData (Dreher et al., 2017), USA from OECD (2017a); AfDB and World Bank from respective annual reports.  
Note: Real 2013 US$. Includes all official finance regardless of financial terms for all African countries.  
 
 
For the world’s poorest region, with huge developmental needs and woefully limited access to 
investment finance compared to Latin America and Asia, this shift has quickly established China as a 
major player to be reckoned with. This is particularly the case since the bulk of Chinese official finance 
has been directed toward lower-income African countries—that is, those classified as “concessional” by 
the World Bank and the AfDB. Concessional countries received 89% of total Chinese finance in Africa 
between 2000 and 2014 (Figure 2), and the average amount per country/year is more than double that 
of non-concessional countries (US$146 million vs. US$62 million over the period). What is more, a large 
share of the resources provided by China has been directed to economic infrastructure (transport, 
energy, water and telecoms), which many African countries have been clamoring for but which 
traditional aid providers—often focused instead on social and institutional issues like healthcare, primary 
education or governmental reform—have been less inclined to supply.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97.0
113.9
65.0
117.0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
China World Bank AfDB USA
US
$ 
Bi
lli
on
s (
20
13
 R
ea
l)
3 
 
Figure 2. Chinese official finance to Africa, by country classification (2000-2014) 
 
Source: AidData (Dreher et al., 2017). 
Notes: Real 2013 US$. The dominance of Chinese lending to concessional countries is driven by both the greater number of 
concessional countries as well as substantially greater amount lending to the individual countries within this group.  
 
 
China’s rapidly rising role in African development finance has come with considerable controversy. 
Some observers consider it a new form of colonialism, noting frequent links between Chinese finance 
and commodity extraction as well as the use of Chinese labor and companies to build African 
infrastructure projects (Sanusi, 2013). Others have suggested that Chinese finance has negative political 
and social impacts, including links to corruption (Dreher et al., 2014, Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018 and 
Brazys et al., 2017), dictatorial regimes (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008) and weakened social and 
environmental standards (Bosshard, 2008). In short, China’s rising involvement in development finance 
is perceived by many as “rogue aid”, to use Naim’s oft-cited phrase (Naim 2009): undermining the 
activities of western-controlled development institutions and the rules for efficient development 
assistance jointly developed over many years.  
 
Despite the heated rhetoric, relatively little systematic academic work exists investigating whether and 
how China’s influence has changed the way traditional development financiers operate in Africa. Two 
notable exceptions are Kilama (2016) and Swedlund (2017), both of which are discussed in more detail 
below. In contrast to these studies, we focus specifically on MDBs, and additionally compare these 
results to results for DAC donors as a whole. Are these traditional development finance institutions 
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changing their allocation patterns in reaction to China—either ramping up their lending to compete with 
China for influence, or taking a more needs-based approach to reduce lending where China is more 
active and use resources elsewhere? Are borrower countries making use of this huge new player to gain 
leverage against existing donors, choosing one source of finance over another depending on their 
circumstances?  
 
This paper addresses these questions by focusing on how flows from the World Bank and the AfDB, and 
secondarily OECD DAC donors, change over time as Chinese finance increases, in terms of both overall 
volumes as well as the sectoral breakdown of finance. The focus is not on the drivers of China’s activities, 
but rather takes Chinese finance as an independent variable that might change the activities of other 
development financiers. The study uses a mixed methods approach, first examining development 
finance patterns in Africa from 2000 to 2014 using descriptive and multivariate statistical techniques and 
second undertaking a series of interviews with government officials responsible for negotiations with 
external development financiers in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Malawi, mainly at ministries of finance but 
also line ministries and agencies responsible for infrastructure projects. 
 
2. Existing Literature and Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
A growing body of academic literature as well as policy research considers the motivations and practices 
of China’s official overseas development finance, both broadly around the world and more specifically 
in Africa (among others see Bader, 2015; Bräutigam, 2011; Bräutigam and Gallagher, 2014; Dreher et 
al., 2014, 2015 and forthcoming; and Greenhill et al., 2013). 
 
However, considerably fewer studies have considered how Chinese finance is impacting other 
development actors or socio-economic developments in recipient countries. Wako (2017) finds that 
Chinese finance has a greater impact on economic growth than that of traditional donors, but that it has 
a negative institutional effect. Addressing concerns that rising Chinese debt may unbalance fiscal 
policies in recipient countries, Kilama (2015) finds no evidence of fiscal “disaster” linked to Chinese 
involvement. The same paper also discusses in some detail the possibility that Chinese finance gives 
recipients more options and greater leverage against traditional donors, following similar points raised 
by Greenhill et. al. (2013). In a policy article oriented toward how DAC donors should respond to 
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Chinese finance, Lindemann (2013) speculates that China may undermine policy conditionality: “In the 
future, conditionalities will be even more difficult to enforce in Africa, as China largely provides its 
assistance without imposing conditions, thus giving the recipient countries greater freedom of choice. 
As a result, it is now easier to reject development aid that is tied to conditions.” (p. 3). Statistical analysis 
of World Bank loan conditions in Africa by Hernandez (2016) supports this position. 
 
Two papers closely aligned with the interests of the present study are Kilama (2016) and Swedlund 
(2017). Kilama (2016) takes a statistical approach to consider how selected DAC donors have reacted to 
Chinese finance in Africa between 2000 and 2011. The paper finds a positive relationship between 
Chinese official finance and the development operations of these donors in recipient countries of 
strategic interest, notably for trade, suggesting that DAC donors are inclined to compete for influence 
with China through their development aid activities. Further, the study’s findings suggest that major DAC 
donors shift resources from social sector support into infrastructure in strategically important recipient 
countries when China is more active. This result is interpreted as additional evidence for increased 
competition.  
 
Swedlund (2017) uses a survey of donor officials in combination with case studies for selected African 
countries to investigate how the rise of Chinese financing impacts the bargaining power of recipient 
countries vis-à-vis traditional donors (including both bilateral and multilateral organizations). She finds 
only limited evidence that China is shifting the relationship between traditional donors and recipient 
countries. However, the study suggests that i) when really faced with a choice, countries in some cases 
do prefer Chinese financing to traditional donors and ii) that as countries become less aid-dependent, 
the influence of China may be rising. 
 
In contrast to both previous papers, our paper specifically focuses on the two major MDBs operating in 
Africa: the World Bank and the AfDB. These funding agencies are of particular interest for three reasons. 
First, they are providers of substantial development finance to governments in Africa. On average for 
2000-2014, each MDB provided over US$7.5 billion per year in development finance to African 
governments—well above the amount provided by any other DAC donor apart from the USA (which also 
supplied a bit over US$7.5 billion per year on average). Second, because they are multilateral agencies 
in which dozens of countries are members—including all recipient countries as well as most wealthy 
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industrialized nations—one may expect the factors shaping the allocation of their finances to be different 
to bilateral agencies, and therefore worth analyzing separately. And third, again in part due to their 
multilateral membership and hence legitimacy, as well as their perceived developmental expertise, both 
MDBs (especially the World Bank) play an important role in defining the developmental agenda and 
coordinating the activities of other donors. This is true both in individual country contexts as well as in 
development policy more broadly—including best practices in areas such as project preparation, 
environmental and social safeguards, etc.  
 
To hypothesize how China’s activities might affect these MDBs, it is first necessary to consider theoretical 
approaches attempting to explain the activities of MDBs. The theoretical traditions seeking to explain 
the actions of international organizations in general and MDBs in particular is vast, but one strand that 
has gained substantial traction and support is realism: the view that MDBs are driven mainly by the self-
interested considerations of a one or a few powerful nations (mainly the United States) that are seen to 
control these organizations. Realist-oriented scholars have utilized quantitative methods to investigate 
statistical links between MDB lending patterns and alignment with US foreign policy priorities (among 
many others, Andersen et al., 2005; Dreher and Vreeland, 2014; Kilby and Kersting, 2016; and Kilby, 
2011), while others have taken a more qualitative approach by analyzing the historical record for 
evidence of US influence shaping MDB activities (Ascher, 1990; Woods, 2006; Babb, 2009). 
 
How would a realist approach suggest that MDBs would likely react to the rapidly rising incursions of 
China into development finance? If one supposes that i) MDBs are used as a means to exercise power 
by either punishing enemies or rewarding allies of the major powers, and ii) that China—a major 
geopolitical rival of the traditional western powers—is using its resources to do the same, then the logical 
conclusion would be that MDBs would tend to compete with China as a way of maintaining the influence 
of the traditional powers in recipient countries. As a consequence, they should try to keep the share of 
their funding at least at par with Chinese funding, implying an increase in absolute volumes. This is what 
Kilama’s (2016) analysis suggests for G7 donors, and if the realist arguments are correct, the influence 
of these bilateral donors as shareholders within the MDBs should drive MDB finance allocation in the 
same direction.  
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The MDBs may also be trying to compete with China less directly from a purely realist perspective of 
what their major donors want, but rather through a more constructivist-oriented desire to remain 
relevant in their countries of operation as a go-to development agency. As well, financial considerations 
could play a role, since MDBs have a financial incentive to lend to non-concessional countries due to the 
revenue this lending generates, which covers MDB administrative expenses and also generates net 
income used by shareholders for various purposes (see Humphrey 2014 for more on this).  
 
At the same time, there may be constraints on the demand side. If there is only a limited amount of 
funding desired by the recipient countries, competition through the inflow of Chinese finance could also 
mean that MDBs with all their unwanted safeguards, complex procedures and other characteristics 
typically disliked by the recipients are driven out of the market. From this perspective, one would expect 
MDB finance to go down. Especially for non-concessional lending, it is hard to imagine unlimited 
demand. This implies that overall, theory does not give us a clear indication of what to expect. The 
reaction of MDB lending to Chinese finance remains an empirical question.  
 
Along with reactions in terms of overall lending volumes, there may also be changes in the sectoral 
allocation of funds. It is primarily the infrastructure sector that is the main area for MDB safeguards, e.g., 
to prevent negative consequences for people living in areas that are flooded in the context of major 
hydropower projects or the like. At the same time, Chinese lending primarily flows into this sector, and 
the sector is of high priority in the eyes of most recipient governments. The latter may again drive 
western stakeholders to push the MDBs into competition by increasing the share of infrastructure 
lending in MDB finance. In case there are demand-side constraints, the easy access to Chinese lending 
could, however, also drive the MDBs out of this sector into areas like budget support, in which 
governments feel less disturbed in their autonomy. Alternatively, it could incentivize MDBs to reduce 
bureaucratic “hassle factors” like environmental and social safeguards in order to keep their 
infrastructure lending at least at the same level as before. 
 
MDBs themselves vary with respect to both the institutionalized influence of major western countries, 
and the complexity of their procedures as well as the emphasis on social and/or environmental 
safeguards. Rather than lumping together the World Bank and the major regional development banks, 
newer research has thus taken a more nuanced approach. Studies such as Lyne et al. (2009) note that it 
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may well be worth considering a broader view of MDB governance, and that the views of smaller 
countries may still play a role in shaping some policies. Copelovitch (2010) follows a conceptually similar 
approach in relation to the IMF.  
 
Humphrey and Michaelowa (2013), Humphrey (2014) and Humphrey (2015a) go further, suggesting that 
in fact a continuum of governance arrangements characterizes MDBs. These studies focus on Latin 
America, and highlight that while the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is strongly influenced by 
the U.S. and other G7 powers, it in fact operates substantially differently than the World Bank, in a way 
that is more in line with the preferences of borrower countries. While the US retains veto voting power 
at the IDB and can (and does) insist on the implementation of policies very similar to the World Bank, 
the greater power of borrower countries in IDB governance compared to the World Bank as well as the 
higher proportion of IDB staff coming from borrower countries means the application of those policies 
is considerably more “borrower-friendly”.  
 
The AfDB, like the IDB, is also still majority controlled by borrower African countries (60% of total voting 
shares), but unlike the IDB, the U.S. does not have any formal veto voting power. At the same time, the 
AfDB is highly dependent on donations from wealthy shareholders to support its concessional African 
Development Fund (ADF) lending window, which lends to the majority of African countries. As a result, 
like the IDB, the AfDB has broadly similar overall policies as the World Bank related to environmental 
and social safeguards, loan processing times, policy conditionality and sectors of operation.  
 
However, should the impact of greater borrower country voice at the AfDB parallel that of the IDB, one 
can expect that the AfDB would be “friendlier” to borrower countries, more flexible in how policies are 
applied and more inclined to follow borrower country lead on where to direct its resources. Hence, the 
AfDB would be less likely to react to Chinese activity compared to the World Bank, on the one hand 
because the bank is already acting closer to borrower demands, and on the other, because African 
countries are less likely to see China as a competitive threat. Hence, whether or not there is a difference 
between the reactions of the two major MDBs active in Africa to Chinese lending also remains an 
empirical question.  
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We use descriptive statistics and econometric analysis to present the empirical evidence. This analysis 
generates some initial evidence to suggest which of the above interpretations appear most plausible. In 
a second step, we complement our analysis with a series of in-depth interviews with borrower 
government officials in three African countries where China is active. Obviously, the results of these 
interviews are also far from definitive, as government officials may well have their own agendas and 
reasons for making certain statements. However, the combination of the two approaches should provide 
a good starting point for further analysis, and can also raise potential interpretations not considered so 
far.  
 
3. Statistical Analysis of Development Finance in Africa, 2000-2014 
 
The most straightforward way to examine how the World Bank, the AfDB and DAC donors are reacting 
to China’s rising role in African development finance is to examine finance patterns over time. While one 
may dispute how the results should be interpreted, the numbers themselves reflect actual developments 
in a relatively objective way. We consider the period from 2000 onwards because it is only since the new 
millennium that Chinese development finance has increased so dramatically. 
 
3.1 Data and Sources 
The central variables for this study are development finance for Africa, provided by China on the one 
hand, and by the World Bank and the AfDB on the other hand. In addition, we include bilateral aid by 
DAC donors for comparison. We use project information in total amounts and broken down by sector, 
always aggregated by year and recipient country. Following a consensus in the aid allocation literature, 
we focus on commitments—the amount agreed at the start to be supplied by the financier for the totality 
of each project—rather than disbursements—the amount transferred each year from the financier to the 
borrower. The former provide a better basis for understanding the motivations of both the financiers 
and the borrowers when a project is agreed upon even if, eventually, the project may not always be 
carried out. We only include finance provided directly to or guaranteed by sovereign governments, as 
opposed to finance directly to private sector borrowers in Africa—thus excluding lending by the AfDB’s 
private sector lending window and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC). All finance 
commitments were converted into real (2013) US dollars, using the U.S. Consumer Price Index.  
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As far as available, data for World Bank and AfDB commitments come from the respective annual reports 
of each MDB (World Bank, 2000-2014; AfDB, 2000-2009). The AfDB has not included project-by-project 
descriptions of annual commitments in their annual report since 2010, but provided the complementary 
data directly to the authors (AfDB, 2010-2014). The OECD DAC database (OECD, 2017a) includes the 
relevant information for all bilateral DAC donors, and AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, 
2000-2014, Version 1.0 provides the information for Chinese resources (Dreher et al., 2017). The latter 
includes Chinese funding from diverse sources, most notably from two major state-owned banks: 
Chinese Ex-Im Bank and China Development Bank. Further resources are also provided directly by the 
Chinese government (see Zhang and Smith 2017 for a breakdown of Chinese aid institutions). However, 
direct project-level information on Chinese finance from these sources is limited and unreliable. 
Therefore AidData relies on a compilation of information from news reports and public statements by 
Chinese and recipient country governments, along with official statistics. Despite remaining deficiencies 
regarding the accuracy of the data—notably a risk of overstatement by public officials and the media as 
noted by Bräutigam and Hwang (2016)—this is the only realistic technique to build such a database in 
the absence of comprehensive data from Chinese authorities.3 It should also be noted that the most 
recent data available from AidData (2017) that we use here have been significantly revised from earlier 
versions and partially take into account earlier criticism.  
 
As mentioned above we distinguish between development finance to recipients classified as 
concessional and non-concessional by MDBs. Because most Chinese finance is directed to concessional 
countries (see Figure 2 above), the impact of Chinese activity on MDB lending in these countries is the 
main focus of interest in this study. Countries accessing concessional MDB finance are generally very 
poor, and receive financing in the form of mainly zero interest, long maturity loans from the MDBs, along 
with some grants. Non-concessional countries, on the other hand, receive loans at terms closer to market 
rates, although still more attractive than the governments would be able to obtain on their own. African 
countries also receive DAC resources at varying terms—Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is 
mostly grant resources, and Other Official Flows (OOF), which are loans closer in financial terms to MDB 
non-concessional loans. However, DAC donors allocate ODA vs. OOF as they see fit on a project-by-
project basis, and do not necessarily follow the MDB division between concessional and non-
                                                             
3 Bräutigam and Hwang (2016) present different numbers from AidData for the 2000-2014 period, based on the database of the 
SAIS-CARI project, but this data unfortunately cannot be broken down by country-year-sector, as AidData’s can, and thus was not 
usable for this project.  
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concessional countries. It should be noted, however, that OOF funding is a very small portion of DAC 
resource flows—only 1.6% of DAC flows to Africa in 2000-2014. Chinese finance comes at financial terms 
that vary by project, and are usually a bit above MDB non-concessional rates but still below what private 
markets would offer the borrowers.  While we need to consider the MDBs’ differentiation between 
concessional and non-concessional at recipient level because it relates to donors’ strategic interests as 
well as to possible differences in demand for funding as highlighted above, the rather fuzzy project-by-
project distinction of financial terms by the bilateral donors is less relevant for our analysis. For each 
recipient and donor or lending agency, we will hence simply consider all development funding 
combined, independently of financial terms.  
 
In terms of sectoral categories, we distinguish between infrastructure, social, and budget support. When 
MDB projects had more than one component—for example building rural roads, promoting good crop 
management, and supporting village councils—we allocated resources to different sectors based on the 
project description. The infrastructure category includes physical infrastructure in areas such as 
transport, water, housing, urban renewal, and energy. However, it does not include loans intended to 
support infrastructure-related institutions. For example, a loan to reform a country’s transport ministry 
or to privatize a railway would not be included. “Social” includes health, education, gender, youth and 
social protection. “Budget support” is all resources put directly in a government’s budget, without 
earmarked spending purposes. As mentioned above, we expect competitive pressures to become 
visible mostly in the infrastructure sector, but balancing effects may be reflected in the other two sectors. 
The fact that donors may have a preference for social projects (as they are publicly perceived as “pro-
poor” and hence more popular), and recipients may prefer budget support (since it gives them greater 
freedom to spend resources), make it appropriate to check for secondary effects in these categories.  
 
Generally, for both MDBs and for Chinese finance, sector coding requires examining the relevant 
commitments on a loan-by-loan basis, while the DAC database provides the sector categories directly. 
Due to the lack of detailed project descriptions, the relevant sector was in some cases not entirely 
obvious for Chinese official development finance, and the authors used judgment based on available 
information from AidData. As to be expected, the vast majority of finance was for physical infrastructure, 
and Chinese sources provided almost no budget support.  
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
As a first step, a series of descriptive statistics were generated comparing commitments from the AfDB, 
the World Bank and DAC donors against those from China. These were plotted visually to capture any 
obvious trends and patterns, regardless of the potential impact of control variables to be added in the 
multivariate framework.  
 
When considered in aggregate, for all countries and not separating concessional vs. non-concessional 
countries, all three traditional financiers show a relatively similar trend: rising steadily (more steeply in 
the case of DAC) up to the mid-2000s, followed by a spike clearly in response to the global financial 
crisis of 2008, and then a subsequent plateau (Figure 3). Chinese finance, on the other hand, shows a 
strong positive growth trend throughout the period, although with more variation compared to the 
MDBs. This is likely due to the fact that China tends to commit very large sums of money at once in some 
countries, sometimes preceded or followed by no lending at all. By contrast the MDBs tend to commit 
a certain level of resources each year.  
 
Figure 3. Total lending commitments, all countries, 2000-2014 
 
Sources: AidData (Dreher et al., 2017), OECD (2017b), World Bank (2000-2014), AfDB (2000-2009; 2010-2014).  
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While the above data is interesting in and of itself, it does not directly suggest any effect Chinese lending 
may have on other development financiers. In an attempt to get closer to that question, we build a sub-
set of data of the countries in which China is most active. Between 2000 and 2014, 12 countries have 
received at least US$3 billion Chinese finance, and these account for nearly 80% of all Chinese finance 
in the period.4 However, because two countries (Sudan and Zimbabwe) have received no finance from 
either the World Bank or the AfDB during the period, they were excluded (an issue to which we will 
return later), leaving 10 countries. We then compare 2000-2014 lending trends by the World Bank, the 
AfDB and DAC to those 10 countries, versus lending by the same organizations to all other African 
countries. Should patterns be divergent, that may indicate that the traditional financiers are reacting to 
Chinese finance flows.  
 
Looking first at overall finance commitments, some slightly divergent patterns are apparent, but without 
any clear trend that can be usefully interpreted (Figure 4). Note that the spike in DAC lending to China-
favored countries in the mid-2000s is the result of two years of exceptionally lending to Nigeria, which 
did not continue. Excluding that spike DAC lending seems to follow a roughly similar pattern in both 
sets of countries, as does that of the two MDBs. Discerning any further reaction of DAC or MDBs to China 
in terms of total lending volumes requires a more fine-grained multivariate approach.  
 
 
Figure 4. Total finance, China-favored countries (left) and all others (right) 
  
Sources: OECD (2017a), World Bank (2000-2014), AfDB (2000-2009; 2010-2014). 
                                                             
4 These countries are: Angola ($13.2 billion), Ethiopia ($13.5 billion), Sudan ($7.5 billion), Nigeria ($5.6 billion), Kenya ($5.2 billion), 
Cameroon ($4.7 billion), Zimbabwe ($4.6 billion), Cote d’Ivoire ($4.2 billion), South Africa ($4 billion), Ghana ($3.9 billion), Zambia 
($3.4 billion), Tanzania ($3.3 billion).  
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One can undertake a similar analysis looking at sectoral lending. Infrastructure lending is of particular 
interest, as China has overwhelmingly lent for infrastructure projects and the traditional development 
financiers have been perceived as falling short in this area in recent decades (Humphrey, 2015b). Here 
again, the patterns are not easily interpreted, but a tendency can nonetheless be detected for both the 
World Bank and (especially) the AfDB to commit more infrastructure finance in countries favored by the 
Chinese, as opposed to other African countries (Figure 5). Interestingly, DAC donors show no similar 
reaction, which may be the result of a much stronger interest in supporting social programs by traditional 
bilateral donors, whereas MDBs had in the past a major role in infrastructure, which Chinese activity may 
have helped re-start.  
 
 
Figure 5. Infrastructure finance, China-favored countries (left) and all others (right) 
  
Sources: OECD (2017a), World Bank (2000-2014), AfDB (2000-2009; 2010-2014). 
 
 
Overall, descriptive statistics do not provide much evidence regarding the reaction of traditional 
development financiers to Chinese activity in Africa, in terms of overall lending amounts. Both MDBs do 
appear to have shifted some of their resources more toward infrastructure in countries favored by 
Chinese finance, while DAC donors did not react in a similar fashion. However, it is clearly possible that 
other factors could be causing this difference in trends, and hence we now turn to a multivariate 
statistical framework. 
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3.3 Multivariate Statistical Analysis 
We now examine whether any significant reaction by the MDBs to Chinese finance can be observed in 
a multivariate panel analysis. We follow the traditional aid allocation literature and include a series of 
indicators for recipient need, recipient merit, and donor interest: GDP per capita, under 5 child mortality, 
population, the ratio of hard currency reserves to external debt (as a proxy for short-term country 
financial needs), resource rents in % of GDP, voting alignment with United States in the United Nations, 
and the Political Freedom Index (as an indicator of good governance and hence recipient merit). For the 
exact definitions of all variables and data sources, see Appendix, Table A3.  
 
The time structure of the panel regressions poses some interesting choices. Some type of time lag is 
necessary, as it is not likely that the MDBs or DAC donors would be able to react immediately to the 
activities of Chinese financiers in a given country. Preparing projects takes time, particularly in the case 
of the traditional donors—this is in fact often a complaint leveled against them by recipient countries. 
According to data from the MDBs themselves, average time from the start of project preparation to the 
commitment stage at the World Bank was 16 months in 2008 (the earliest year for which data is 
available), declining slightly to 14 months in 2013 (World Bank, 2008 and 2013). In the case of the AfDB, 
lead time for commitments has averaged around seven months from 2012 (the earliest available data) 
to 2014. In the case of investment projects (particularly infrastructure), lead times are often much longer 
due to required environmental assessments, procurement processes and technical preparation, while 
budget support loans are often quicker. As well, one can logically assume that the MDBs may not react 
sharply to each year’s changes in Chinese finance, but rather to the pattern of ongoing activity over more 
than one year. To address both of these issues, our main specification is based on two-year period 
averages for our main explanatory variable, i.e., Chinese finance, and for all control variables, while the 
finance of MDBs (and similarly, DAC finance), i.e., the variables to be explained, are measured for one 
year ahead of the latest of the two years.  
 
We select a simple, but robust linear fixed effects model (with recipient and period fixed effects) as our 
main specification, with standard clustered at the recipient level. Table 1 presents the results in terms of 
overall finance volumes. Alternative specifications taking into the censored nature of the lending data 
(tobit or ppml) show substantially very similar results (see Appendix, Table A1, regression blocks e and 
f). 
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It appears that for concessional countries, there is no systematic relationship between Chinese funding 
and the finance volumes of either the World Bank (column 1), the AfDB (column 2) or MDBs taken 
together (column 3). As opposed to what prior analysis may lead us to believe, based on the revised 
AidData information on Chinese finance that we use, such a relationship is not observable for DAC 
donors either. The lack of any kind of relationship is remarkably robust across different alternative 
specifications. In the Appendix, Table A1 shows alternative estimation models. In addition to the 
alternative models already mentioned above, they include specifications (a) without period fixed effects, 
(b) with recipient random effects rather than fixed effects, (c) using the natural logarithm of all finance 
variables, and (d) using single-year rather than two-year periods, i.e., an annual panel with the 
dependent variable measured always one year ahead of time. Only in one out of 28 regressions is the 
coefficient of Chinese finance for concessional countries significant (at the 10% level) for any of the MDBs 
or for DAC donors.  
 
The situation for MDBs is different for non-concessional countries. The interaction of a non-concessional 
country dummy and Chinese finance is significantly positive in almost all regressions for the World Bank 
and for both MDBs jointly. The model with logged aid variables (Appendix Table A1, blocks c and e) 
suggests that this may also be the case for AfDB finance individually, albeit to a smaller extent. The 
reaction of the MDBs to Chinese lending is hence significantly different for these two country groups.  
For the World Bank, the result is very robust and not driven by any single country. We test this by 
repeating the computation of Table 1 while leaving out, one by one, each of the nine non-concessional 
African countries in our sample. The interaction term remains significant in each case, and the World 
Bank consistently shows an increase of its lending when Chinese finance increases.  
 
This is in strong contrast to DAC aid. In Tables 1 and A1 taken together, there is only a single positively 
significant coefficient in all seven DAC-related regressions. This suggests that for DAC donors, in non-
concessional just as in concessional countries, there is no systematic link to Chinese lending.  
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Table 1: Response to Chinese lending in funding volumes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
WB 
finance 
AfDB 
finance 
MDB 
finance 
DAC 
finance 
          
Chinese finance 0.018 0.086 0.104 -0.079 
 (0.76) (0.21) (0.19) (0.82) 
Non-concessional*Chinese finance 0.678*** -0.005 0.672*** 0.203 
 (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.59) 
GDP per capita 0.019 0.046* 0.065 0.048 
 (0.41) (0.09) (0.13) (0.55) 
Under 5 mortality 1.019 -0.730 0.289 -2.939 
 (0.55) (0.18) (0.88) (0.40) 
Population 15.565 4.814 20.377 73.549* 
 (0.21) (0.59) (0.21) (0.07) 
Population squared 0.039 0.004 0.043 -0.417*** 
 (0.32) (0.89) (0.42) (0.00) 
Reserves -0.057** -0.033 -0.090** -0.121 
 (0.01) (0.25) (0.02) (0.23) 
Resource rents -1.344 0.558 -0.786 1.109 
 (0.60) (0.89) (0.89) (0.91) 
UN voting with US -219.331 -106.025 -325.396 -1,050.166 
 (0.21) (0.76) (0.47) (0.38) 
Political freedom index -27.982 26.978 -1.011 -65.310 
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.98) (0.24) 
     
Recipient FE YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 268 268 268 268 
Number of recipients 46 46 46 46 
R-squared (within) 0.193 0.054 0.140 0.085 
Notes: Dependent variables always refer to the year preceding the two-year period considered for the explanatory variables and 
controls. *,**,and *** show significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively; p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered by recipients. 
 
Table 2 presents the results regarding potential shifts in sector allocations. The upper panel presents 
the relationship between the Chinese share in overall development finance in a given recipient country 
and period, and the share of funding the MDBs and DAC donors allocated to physical infrastructure as 
a share of their total resources spent in the country in the year following this period. The second and 
third panel show the same results, but for social sector finance and budget finance respectively. Controls 
are not shown here, but the full model for infrastructure is presented in the Appendix, Table A2. At the 
exception of the changes in the variables, model specifications are as discussed above.  
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Again, there is no evidence that Chinese finance is associated with any change in the allocation of MDB 
or DAC funding to concessional countries. All coefficients related to the share of Chinese aid remain 
insignificant, both in the main table and in Table A2 in the Appendix. The latter includes the same 
changes in model specifications as explained above for models a-d in Table A1, with the exception of 
the log-log specification, which does not appear useful here as funding variables are already expressed 
as percentages. 
 
However, we again observe a different situation for non-concessional countries. There is some evidence 
that in these countries, AfDB lending to infrastructure is somehow crowded out by Chinese finance. This 
is also observable for DAC donors, but only in the annual panel, suggesting that their sectoral 
reallocation may happen faster than at the AfDB. Generally, these results appear less robust, however, 
than those on non-concessional finance volumes discussed in the context of Table 1. They depend 
notably on the inclusion of recipient fixed effects (see Table A2, regression 2c). Leave-one-out validation 
also shows that the AfDB result in Table 2 loses significance when omitting Mauritius (results not shown). 
 
Table 2: Response to Chinese lending in sector allocation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 WB AfDB MDBs DAC 
  Infrastructure finance  
% Chinese -0.170 -0.210 -0.157 0.024 
 (0.34) (0.24) (0.46) (0.67) 
Non-concessional*% Chinese 0.454 -1.445*** -0.518 0.213 
  (0.21) (0.01) (0.31) (0.31) 
 Social sector finance 
% Chinese -0.241 0.264 -0.228 0.029 
 (0.15) (0.36) (0.2) (0.7) 
Non-concessional*% Chinese 0.209 -0.122 -0.124 -0.294 
 (0.29) (0.72) (0.75) (0.22) 
  Budget finance 
% Chinese 0.088 -0.132 0.064 0.004 
 (0.64) (0.76) (0.68) (0.87) 
Non-concessional*% Chinese -0.685 1.033 0.007 0.176 
  (0.12) (0.10) (0.99) (0.23) 
Recipient FE YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Controls as in Table 1. For a full presentation of the model on infrastructure finance, see Appendix, Table A2. Dependent 
variables always refer to the year preceding the two-year period considered for the explanatory variables and controls. *,**,and 
*** show significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively; p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by recipients.  
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Overall, these findings reveal that in concessional countries, both finance amounts and sector shares are 
not associated (either positively or negatively) with Chinese lending. Hence, based on the data we 
employ here, it does not appear that MDBs and bilateral donors have reacted in any systematic way to 
the influx of Chinese finance to concessional countries in Africa. By contrast, evidence suggests that this 
is different for the economically more advanced non-concessional recipient countries. Here, especially 
the World Bank appears to adjust lending volumes upward in response to Chinese finance, and the AfDB 
and possibly the DAC donors reduce infrastructure lending.  
 
We now turn to qualitative evidence from interviews in three African countries. The findings of both the 
descriptive and multivariate statistics, along with the qualitative evidence, are discussed jointly in a 
subsequent section. 
 
4. Qualitative Evidence from Interviews: Ethiopia, Tanzania and 
Malawi 
 
To get a better sense of how increasing Chinese finance might be influencing traditional development 
financiers, we undertook 17 interviews with government officials in three African countries: Ethiopia, 
Tanzania and Malawi. The intention is to better understand the factors that might cause recipient 
countries to favor one source of finance over another, if any; and the perception of recipient countries 
on the motivations of traditional development financiers. Because of the preponderance of Chinese 
official finance to concessional African countries and the relevance of poorer countries to international 
development policy—particularly in Africa—the interviews were conducted in three countries eligible for 
concessional financing by the MDBs. Hence, the interview material is mainly relevant to concessional 
countries, and can only speak indirectly to higher-income non-concessional countries.   
 
4.1 Background and Justification of Interview Strategy 
The choice of focusing on recipient government officials was driven by three main considerations. First, 
the literature has heretofore overly focused on the “supply side” of development finance: the internal 
factors shaping the supply of finance, such as development needs as perceived by external actors, 
geopolitical considerations, internal bureaucratic factors, etc. While these factors are clearly relevant, it 
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is important not to neglect the agency of recipient governments, particularly in an era of increasing 
financial options (Greenhill et al., 2013; Humphrey and Michaelowa, 2013). Second, while recipient 
government officials clearly have their own agendas and interviews must be interpreted with caution, in 
our experience they are quite open—and in fact enjoy—discussing the relative merits and motivations of 
external development financiers with whom they engage regularly. As opposed to officials within 
bilateral and multilateral agencies, who are less likely to be open about factors driving their lending that 
do not match their stated mandates of reducing poverty, government officials have no official mandates 
to defend in this respect and hence no direct incentive to polish up their statements. Third, Swedlund 
(2017) already undertook a survey of development agency officials in Africa, with the results generally 
showing little impact of Chinese aid on their decision-making and negotiating power with recipient 
countries. Rather than replicate that work, our study chose to focus instead on recipient officials to 
generate fresh evidence from the “demand” side of the development finance relationship.  
 
The three countries chosen are similar in having remained generally political stable and peaceful in 
recent years, and have all actively engaged with external traditional and new development finance 
providers during the period of observation. At the same time, they provide significant variation in the 
inflows of Chinese finance of relevance to the research questions, to ascertain if this generates variation 
in the response of traditional development financiers. Ethiopia has received a huge amount of Chinese 
resources—nearly $11 billion between 2000 and 2014—the second highest of any country in Africa (after 
Angola, at $14.6 billion). Tanzania has received substantial amounts as well, but considerably less—$4 
billion over the period—while Malawi has received only about $500 million.  
 
The majority of the interviews (11) were with officials currently (or in two cases, formerly) in the ministries 
of finance, while the remainder were in line ministries heavily engaged with external development 
finance, including electric power, transportation and agriculture. All officials had regular interactions 
with a variety of development finance providers, including traditional sources as well as (in most but not 
all cases) the Chinese. All interviews were undertaken on the understanding that respondents could be 
listed (see reference section), but would not be individually identified in relation to specific statements 
or opinions. With one exception (done by telephone), each interview was conducted face-to-face in 
government offices.  
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4.2 Main Findings 
We focus on two main themes from the interviews of particular relevance to the research questions 
posed in this paper and on which there was a very high degree of correspondence (and in some cases 
unanimity) among respondents: 
- Overall available development finance envelope 
- Sectoral allocation of resources 
4.3 Overall Development Finance Envelope 
A critical finding which helps explain the insignificant results from the statistical analysis above, 
particularly in relation to the MDBs, is that all three countries took every available dollar of concessional 
and ODA resources on offer, for purely financial reasons. First, and most obviously, concessional 
resources offer the best financial terms available, with usually zero interest rate and very long repayment 
periods. DAC ODA resources are even better, often in the form of grants—that is, entirely free money. 
Second, all three countries have limits imposed by the IMF on the level of non-concessional resources 
their governments are allowed to borrow each year, due to their participation in either the Highly 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) or the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) (or both, for Ethiopia and 
Malawi). 
 
Hence, the countries are generally happy to take all concessional/ODA resources available, regardless 
of the type of project attached or the characteristics of the lending source. “We take every penny [of 
IDA], and we push for more,” said a Finance Ministry official from one country. “We might not always like 
them [the World Bank and the AfDB], but we need them for the money. We can’t not use them,” said an 
official from another country. A third official from an infrastructure line ministry explained in more detail 
why he could not borrow more from export credit agencies (ECA) like the China Ex-Im: “The problem is 
that the Ministry of Finance is mostly refusing. Every time we bring these ECA proposals, which are still 
cheaper than commercial finance, they will look at the IMF debt ceiling. And that’s an inhibitor. It’s only 
about $800 million per year, which is not very much, and everybody is fighting for that small window. 
And there isn’t enough concessional money.”  
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In addition, because of the nature of their own refinancing, MDB concessional windows cannot react in 
a meaningful way to Chinese finance increases. These windows (for both the World Bank and the AfDB) 
are replenished every three years through laborious rounds of negotiations, and the willingness of 
governments to donate has been on the wane (Figure 6), due in large measure to budgetary restrictions. 
Nor can the allocations be easily shifted among borrower countries to react to Chinese inflows: both the 
World Bank’s IDA and the AfDB’s ADF have relatively transparent “performance-based” criteria defining 
each country’s allocation (Kanbur, 2005; World Bank, 2017b, World Bank, 2014; AfDB, 2018).5 Thus, if 
an MDB were to perceive China’s rising activity in a concessional country as a threat for some reason, it 
would not easily be able to increase the amount of resources it provides to that country to retain its 
influence, even if it wanted to. 
 
Figure 6. Country donations, IDA replenishment rounds 
 
Source: World Bank IDA (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 and 2017).  
 
  
                                                             
5 The World Bank’s criteria for IDA allocation have changed over the years, but have during the entire period of this study 
followed a relatively similar and transparent formula. The most recent formula involves giving each country a “base” allocation of 
US$4.5-6 million, with further amounts depending on a formula that includes: GNI per capita, population, and the country 
performance rating. The latter is, in turn, derived from four sets of Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings and 
and the IDA Portfolio Performance Rating (PPR), as follows: CPR = (.24 * CPIA [A-C] + .68 * CPIA [D] + .08 * PPR). For details, see 
World Bank 2014, Annex 2. Since 1999, ADF has used a similar allocation formula, with minor differences. For details, see AfDB 
2018.  
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4.4 Sector Allocation 
In terms of sectoral allocation, all officials in each of the three countries expressed a clear priority order 
for receiving resources: best is budget support finance not earmarked to any sector, second is physical 
infrastructure (transportation, energy and water, mainly), third is social spending like health and 
education, and least favored is capacity building and institutional reform. However, recipient country 
ability to achieve these priorities varied substantially both by recipient country and by financing source. 
The AfDB is perceived by borrower governments as quite responsive to their requests, and gives a 
markedly higher share of its resources in infrastructure than the World Bank or DAC donors in two of the 
three recipient countries (Figure 7), as well as generally in all African countries. “They are Africans too,” 
said one official. “It’s true that the rich countries have a big influence on their policies, but the staff 
understand what we need and try to help. Because they are a regional bank, maybe they sympathize 
with us more.” Officials in all countries maintained that the AfDB’s activities were not in reaction to the 
increase in Chinese finance, but rather an honest desire to help the country achieve its development 
goals. The main problems recipients have with the AfDB is that the size of available resources is simply 
too small to undertake many of the major infrastructure projects they would like, as well as procedural 
issues (discussed in more detail below).  
 
Figure 7. Share of infrastructure in total lending, 2000-2014 average 
  
Sources: OECD (2017a), World Bank (2000-2014), AfDB (2000-2009; 2010-2014).  
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DAC donors, on the other hand, showed very little flexibility in relation to sectoral allocation, with the 
vast majority going to social projects and institutional support. While Ethiopian officials suggested 
overall DAC amounts may have increased in response to Chinese activity, they were clear that it had little 
influence on project sectors. “These bilaterals, they have very strong ideas on where their money should 
go, and we can’t do much about it,” said one Ethiopian official. “But most of it is grant money anyway. 
Some [bilaterals] have said they might start giving less grants, and offering more as loans, and if they do 
we might have to think a bit more on what we take.” Another official pointed out that since most DAC 
money is in relatively small grants, the amounts are only sufficient for social projects and are not useful 
for infrastructure anyway. Tanzanian and Malawian officials agreed that DAC donors are by far the most 
rigid in defining project sectors.  
 
The World Bank showed some tendency to adapt to government demands in recent years. This was 
most obvious in the case of Ethiopia (with by far the highest amounts of Chinese finance of the three 
countries). Ethiopian officials noted their influence in shaping World Bank project allocations had grown. 
“We have been aggressively working with the World Bank, saying ‘Please invest in roads.’ And they say, 
‘What about capacity building, or something else?’ and we say, ‘No, roads.’ And they have responded.” 
Tanzanian officials also noted greater willingness of the World Bank to offer infrastructure support, but 
not as much as they desired. Asked if the influx of Chinese investment had improved his negotiating 
leverage with the World Bank, a Finance Ministry official said, “Yes of course. That’s the direction we are 
moving in now, because we have more options. If you can’t get the World Bank to fund it, you can find 
someone else.” Malawian officials, in contrast, felt they had essentially no ability to shape World Bank 
sector allocation, but could only passively accept what was offered. “The World Bank should invest more 
in the productive sectors to help this country boost its economic activity […] But we still find that the 
Bank will still want to invest in HIV/AIDS, even though the bilaterals mostly want to spend there too.” 
 
One issue which officials in all three countries noted as limiting their own demand for infrastructure 
lending from the World Bank and to a lesser degree the AfDB is the “hassle factor” implicit in these types 
of projects from project design rules and environmental and social safeguards. Officials from all 
governments concurred that the World Bank in particular was frequently not worth the difficulty. “For 
hydroelectric and railroads, we don’t even talk to them, we just go straight to the Chinese,” said an 
Ethiopian official. Discussing a major gas pipeline project, a Tanzanian official said, “The Chinese are a 
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bit more expensive, but they are a lot easier and a lot faster for this kind of project. We didn’t even send 
a request to the World Bank for support, we went straight to the Chinese.” Even in Malawi, with only 
small amounts of Chinese finance, officials were experiencing these dynamics with a planned new coal-
fired power plant, to be funded by the Chinese at market-based interest rates. “The World Bank and 
AfDB wouldn’t fund it because the powerful shareholders would not agree to that kind of thing for 
environmental reasons. So we went with the Chinese.” Hence, even though World Bank project staff 
showed some desire to accommodate borrower country desire for infrastructure, higher-level policies 
mandated by shareholders limited their ability to do so effectively.  
 
While all officials noted that the AfDB and the World Bank had similar policies on these matters, due to 
the influence of major wealthy-country shareholders, a majority of interviewees (but not all) felt that the 
AfDB was more flexible in the application of these policies, and is more willing to work with countries to 
find a workable solution, while the World Bank was more rigid and process-focused. This finding 
parallels that found in another study comparing the World Bank with the IDB in Latin America (Humphrey 
2015a).  
 
By comparison, Chinese finance involved minimal safeguard reviews, limited only to the approval of the 
relevant recipient government ministry. Procurement is also substantially easier, since it is often 
arranged ahead of time with the Chinese Ex-Im Bank as financier, saving considerable paperwork 
(although also leading to some complaints on value for money, according to several officials). And while 
some officials noted that the quality of Chinese infrastructure—particularly roads—was sometimes sub-
par, they all lauded how fast the Chinese worked, an important factor for governments wanting to show 
quick results to their population.  
 
The World Bank has also shown substantial flexibility in Ethiopia and Tanzania in supplying budget 
support finance, which governments are strongly in favor of since it gives them freedom to allocate 
spending as they see fit. In the case of Ethiopia, officials stated that they have refused traditional budget 
support lending due to disagreements with the World Bank on policy conditionality, but that they have 
made substantial use of the new Program for Results (P4R) instrument. This commits governments to 
achieve certain results through their own spending, which is then reimbursed by the World Bank post 
hoc (for more on P4R, see Cormier, 2016). Due to the very strong centralized planning and control of 
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the Ministry of Finance in Ethiopia, this has been very successful. “It’s basically just like budget support 
for us, it pays for our current spending,” said one official. Tanzania has also received substantial budget 
support, both in traditional policy-based loans (fully one-third of all lending between 2000 and 2014) as 
well as several P4R loans. Malawi, by contrast, has had no P4R loans, and overall the least support of the 
three countries in this flexible lending category (budget support+P4R).  
 
5. Discussion of Findings 
 
How can these different interview-based and statistical findings shed light on the research question of 
how traditional development financiers are responding to the influx of Chinese finance in Africa? We 
first consider the evidence in relation to the total amount of finance from the World Bank and the AfDB 
as well as DAC donors, and subsequently to the question of how those resources are allocated to 
different project sectors. In both cases, we start by discussing the results for the majority of poorer, 
concessional countries (37 in our sample) that receive the bulk of Chinese development finance overall 
and also much higher volumes per country, and that therefore better represent the general dynamics 
we observe in Africa today. We then discuss the apparent differences for non-concessional countries 
(nine countries in our sample), which may provide an indication of how things may evolve once more 
African countries benefit from sustainable economic development and grow out of their concessional 
status.  
 
5.1 Total Financing Levels: Concessional Countries 
Multivariate analysis finds no statistically significant association between the financing commitments of 
the World Bank and the AfDB, and also the DAC donors to Chinese financing in concessional African 
countries between 2000 and 2014. This finding is robust to a number of different test specifications, 
including random and fixed country effects, period fixed effects, different time lag set-ups, and the use 
of tobit or ppml models to account for the censored nature of financing data. This is at first glance a 
rather surprising finding: despite the influx of over $70 billion in new Chinese resources to these 
countries in only 15 years, the main traditional development financiers appear to have not reacted by 
adjusting their funding levels. The finding also seems to contradict Kilama’s (2016) prior evidence with 
respect to DAC bilateral aid. 
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Qualitative interview evidence helps clarify why this is the case. Officials in all three countries clearly 
stated that they took all concessional resources available, because of the highly attractive financial terms, 
making these overall amounts essentially a supply-driven phenomenon. For the MDBs, the amounts 
each country receives, in turn, are determined by lengthy donation rounds and relatively rigid formulas. 
Hence, even if MDB staff or shareholders wanted to increase funding levels to respond to the increase 
in Chinese activity, doing so would be an extremely difficult and lengthy process.  
 
Furthermore, based on our results, there is little evidence that major shareholders would even want to 
put up pressure in this respect. Typically, their interest in balancing the Chinese influence should also 
be reflected in their own bilateral financing. While much of the extant literature on DAC development 
assistance led us to believe that this may be the case, the non-result we obtain for DAC donors questions 
the very basics of this argument. A more in-depth reading of Kilama (2016) reveals that his emphasis on 
the competitive behavior of DAC donors relies merely on the specific cases of strategically important 
recipients, rather than the average recipient of Chinese funding, for which he does not find any 
significantly positive effect on DAC development finance either. In essence, despite numerous 
differences in the econometric set-up and the dataset used, his results are hence in line with ours and 
do not generally suggest a competitive reaction of DAC donors to Chinese lending.  
 
As DAC donors face less bureaucratic obstacles to changing aid allocation than MDBs, nothing would 
stop them if they really wanted to react. The only plausible explanation is hence that their concerns about 
the effect of Chinese finance on the goals of their own funding (be they geopolitical or developmental) 
are rather limited and do not challenge earlier priorities determined by domestic interests and recipient 
need. A demand-side explanation is even more unlikely than for the MDBs, as DAC resources are almost 
entirely grants (i.e., completely free resources), and hence one can safely assume limitless demand on 
the part of poor African nations.  
 
A final point worth noting here in relation to MDBs is that two African countries—Sudan and Zimbabwe—
did not receive any financing from either the World Bank or the AfDB over the period, due to a 
combination of unresolved arrears on past MDB loans and political considerations.6 However, China lent 
                                                             
6 Both countries would almost certainly be classified as concessional if lending were to restart now, due to their economic 
conditions, although Zimbabwe was prior to the halt of lending in 2000 a non-concessional borrower from both the World Bank 
28 
 
very heavily to both countries over the 2000-2014 period—$7.4 billion to Sudan (the third most of any 
African country) and $4.6 billion to Zimbabwe (the seventh highest amount in Africa). These two 
examples in themselves point to the limits of MDB reaction to China: major geopolitical considerations 
and MDB rules on arrears clearance prior to further lending are clear red lines that MDBs will not cross, 
even if one finds other instances where MDBs may be acting competitively in response to China.  
 
5.2 Total Financing Levels: Non-concessional Countries 
The multivariate statistical tests show markedly different results for non-concessional as compared to 
concessional countries. For the World Bank, the interaction term between the dummy for non-
concessional countries and Chinese lending is significant at the 1% level and positive in almost all 
regressions.7 As the coefficient for concessional countries is never distinguishable from zero, we can 
interpret this directly as evidence for a reaction of the World Bank to Chinese lending in non-
concessional countries (significantly different from zero).8 In the models estimating elasticities (log-linear 
model and ppml model), the AfDB regressions also show a positive and strongly significant interaction 
term (though with lower coefficients than for the World Bank), and the interaction term for both MDBs 
jointly is positive and significant in all regressions without any exception. Only for DAC lending, we 
continue to find a null result (except for a single case in which the interaction term is significant, but very 
small). This is surprising given that being concessional and hence economically more advanced could 
be interpreted as a proxy for Kilama’s strategic importance related to natural resources and trade. In any 
case, our finding for MDBs is much more robust and further shows a quantitatively much more 
substantial effect.  
 
What could explain the differential result between non-concessional and concessional countries for 
MDBs? Since the reaction by DAC donors is null (or very small), it is again implausible that the reaction 
by MDBs is driven by pressure from its major shareholders. The answer should therefore lay within the 
MDBs if the increase is driven by the supply side, or with recipient governments. Intuitively, supply-side 
dynamics make more sense here, as it is difficult to imagine why a country’s demand for MDB resources 
                                                             
and the AfDB. (As MDB funding is zero throughout the period of observation, these countries are not included in the econometric 
analysis.) 
7 The only exception is the annual panel, which does not properly reflect the reaction period of MDBs (see the explanations of the 
lag structure at the beginning of the section on the multivariate statistical analysis). 
8 This is corroborated in additional specifications reformulated in a way to measure this effect directly (not shown). 
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would increase at the same time that it accesses greater Chinese financing. Rather, in the context of non-
concessional as opposed to concessional countries, one would expect a reduction of demand, since 
lending is more expensive for these borrowers, so that overall demand should be limited, and Chinese 
funding that comes without additional “hassle factors” could simply provide an attractive substitute for 
MDB finance. This suggests a supply-driven explanation.  
 
In this context, the MDBs’ own financial considerations could play a role. As opposed to lending for 
concessional countries, their budget for non-concessional countries is not restricted by complex 
negotiations about replenishments. The revenue generated by non-concessional lending is very 
important to the overall functioning of MDBs, paying for administrative costs and generating net income 
that is used for various purposes of interest to shareholders (see Humphrey 2014 for more on this point). 
Hence, MDBs have at least some financial interest in holding onto non-concessional borrowers. Since 
this incentive is present at all times and in all non-concessional countries, whether China is active or not, 
an additional assumption required is that the MDBs fear to lose these countries completely if China starts 
dominating and building up a stronger relationship with the relevant governments. An alternative (and 
not mutually exclusive) explanation is that MDBs are driven internally by the desire of staff and 
management to maintain relevance as go-to sources of development expertise in recipient countries. 
While this same motivation may be present in concessional countries, the fact that concessional 
resources are more limited for reasons discussed previously implies, however, that the banks’ actual 
reaction is restricted to non-concessional countries.  
 
If the above argument is correct, it may surprise to see that the statistical results are stronger for the 
World Bank than for the AfDB. In fact, financial considerations are substantially more pressing for the 
AfDB in the Africa region, since it has so few non-concessional borrowers to work with (see Humphrey 
2015c), whereas the World Bank has a large array of non-concessional borrowers in Latin America, Asia 
and Europe. However, our statistical result may be at least partly driven by the simple fact that the AfDB 
has generally much lower lending volumes to allocate. This interpretation is consistent with the finding 
that the result for the AfDB comes out much more clearly when looking at relative change in financing. 
As mentioned above, in the models estimating elasticities the coefficient for the AfDB is highly 
significant, and also substantially important. The ppml model—arguably the model with the least risk of 
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bias—suggests that an increase of Chinese funding by 1% is associated with an increase of AfDB lending 
by 0.21% (0.006+0.204, see Table A1, regression 2e).  
 
As well, the more constructivist interpretation of MDBs competing for relevance in borrowers for internal 
reasons may be more pressing at the World Bank, due to the World Bank’s self-perception as the 
preeminent global finance institution. As a result, World Bank staff and management may be much less 
inclined to give up their relevance in a given country, compared to AfDB staff.  
 
Given the contrast between findings for concessional and non-concessional countries, and the likely rise 
of countries graduating from concessional windows as they develop, further research in this area may 
be relevant, including further interviews with both recipient governments and MDB officials to 
investigate causal channels.  
 
5.3 Sectoral Allocation: Concessional Countries 
As with the overall level of financing, the allocation to different sectors in concessional countries showed 
no systematic reaction by MDBs or DAC to Chinese financing in the multivariate statistical tests, despite 
descriptive statistics suggesting a possible increase in infrastructure lending by the MDBs where 
Chinese resource inflows are high. In the multivariate analysis, this general result seems to be absorbed 
by recipient fixed effects and/or other control variables that simultaneously influence Chinese and MDB 
lending. In other words, it does not reflect a specific link between Chinese and MDB development 
finance. Again, the results are extremely robust across different specifications.  
 
The initially most expected result of a huge increase in aid from China—most of which is in infrastructure—
would have been a decline in infrastructure lending by the MDBs and DAC. Yet in concessional 
countries, the unlimited demand for development finance as a whole also holds for infrastructure 
finance. Unless recipients see the opportunity to convince bilateral donors and MDBs to shift their 
resources into the even more preferred area of budget support, they will not oppose the funding of 
infrastructure. To the contrary, our qualitative evidence suggests that governments try to push the MDBs 
into shifting further funds from other, rather disliked areas such as capacity building and institutional 
reform, into even more infrastructure financing, but with only limited success. Given unlimited demand, 
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MDBs do not even need to weaken their environmental and social safeguard policies or other “hassle 
factors” like procurement rules in response to Chinese competition. This is in fact a much-voiced concern 
in the broader development community (see, e.g., Buntaine, 2016: 104, 222). In concessional countries, 
this concern seem to be without much foundation. Rather, traditional lenders can simply continue with 
business as usual. This also holds for DAC donors whose strong supply-side preference for supporting 
social projects as opposed to infrastructure has not been affected by Chinese lending so far. 
 
5.4 Sectoral Allocation: Non-concessional Countries 
Statistical tests on the sectoral allocation of MDB resources to non-concessional countries again reveal 
some differences as compared to concessional countries. In particular, AfDB infrastructure lending tends 
to be negatively associated with higher Chinese lending. The same is true for DAC aid if we consider the 
regressions based on a quicker, annual reaction period. By contrast, infrastructure lending by the World 
Bank is generally not affected in a statistically significant way. The interaction term between Chinese 
lending and non-concessional countries is even positive, and marginally significant in one regression.  
 
Apart from infrastructure, no further statistical significance was found in any other sector for any of the 
traditional development financiers, although AfDB budget support lending is right on the edge of the 
10% significance level, with a positive coefficient. This could indicate that budget support may take up 
at least a share of the declining infrastructure lending by the AfDB, with the remainder falling into the 
“other” category (not included in our tests).   
 
This finding is consistent with the interpretation that the AfDB is a more client-led, responsive MDB, 
particularly in non-concessional countries that may be pickier about their financing sources (due to 
higher MDB loan costs and greater options). As such, the AfDB may shift resources to other non-
infrastructure sectors in countries receiving more Chinese finance, which is overwhelmingly directed to 
infrastructure. As mentioned above, an increase in budget support is a positive outcome for the 
borrowers, as they tend to prefer non-earmarked resources that give them more freedom to make their 
own allocation decisions. And because the AfDB already has a markedly higher share of infrastructure 
lending than the World Bank—and far above DAC donors—a slight reduction in response to Chinese 
lending is all the more plausible.  
32 
 
It should be noted that shifting the allocation of funding from one sector to the other as in the case of 
the AfDB does not necessarily imply any loss of political influence. A competitive reaction to Chinese 
funding with respect to overall financing volumes and an accommodating reaction in terms of sector 
choice are thus by no means contradictory. 
 
The result for the DAC may be interpreted in similar ways. If we consider that the negatively significant 
coefficient we find in the annual panel reflects the actual dynamics, a plausible interpretation could be 
that traditional bilateral donors switch from infrastructure finance into their anyway preferred social 
sector finance when they see that the most obvious infrastructure needs are covered by the Chinese. 
Indeed in the annual panel, DAC social sector support can be shown to increase as a response to 
Chinese lending—and to do so in fact independently of whether the recipient country is concessional or 
non-concessional (results not shown).  
 
The null-result (or perhaps even positive result) for the World Bank is more difficult to explain. It would 
be consistent with the interpretation that the World Bank attempts to extend its competitive reaction to 
Chinese lending in non-concessional countries overall, to the specific area of infrastructure lending—
possibly because this is the sector in which it sees the prospects for long-term lending at large scale. 
However, given the much disliked “hassle factors” and the opportunity of the wealthier non-concessional 
countries to be selective the World Bank may not be able to lend more. In this case, for non-concessional 
countries, the concern that China’s lack of interest in safeguards will drag down global development 
standards in the long run, may be of some relevance. 9 It is certainly true that in recent years the World 
Bank and other major regional MDBs—the AfDB included—have already worked to reduce the perceived 
“hassle factor” on their operations. However, the most important and frequently-voiced obstacle—
environmental and social safeguards—have not substantially changed during the period of this study. A 
reform of World Bank safeguards is currently underway, but will not be fully implemented for several 
years, and is a relatively minor set of changes compared to the country systems approach used by the 
Chinese. This could indeed have been a limiting factor for the further expansion of the World Bank’s 
infrastructure lending in non-concessional countries. 
                                                             
9 In non-concessional countries, MDBs also have more freedom of action in this respect than in concessional countries where they 
depend on the replenishment procedures, which in turn often serve as a platform for discussions about these safeguards 
(Buntaine, 2016: 122). 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The principle purpose of this study has been to determine if the finance activities of traditional 
development financiers in Africa—in particular, the World Bank and the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), as well as secondarily DAC bilateral donors—have been directly affected by the influx of Chinese 
development finance in the past two decades. This possible effect is examined in two ways: i) whether 
total finance levels to a given country change depending on the level of Chinese finance, and ii) whether 
the sector allocation of project resources changes depending on Chinese activity. To investigate this 
question, the study undertakes a series of statistical tests utilizing data from the MDBs, the OECD / DAC’s 
creditor reporting system, and the AidData database for Chinese finance. We further undertake a series 
of expert interviews with government officials in three African countries who deal directly with external 
development financiers to “ground truth” our statistical findings and to help better understand causal 
factors that are not easily determined purely by statistical tests.  
 
Contrary to the heated rhetoric in the development community about the potential impact of Chinese 
official finance in Africa on traditional development activities, our statistical tests find no evidence that 
MDBs or DAC donors are shifting their overall level of finance, nor its allocation among different sectors, 
in response to Chinese finance in the majority of poorer (concessional) African countries. This result is 
robust across a large number of different statistical specifications. Qualitative interview evidence 
suggests that this is due in good part because i) recipient countries generally take all concessional 
resources available to them due to the very attractive financial terms (limiting potential demand-side 
impacts), and ii) concessional financing from MDBs is not easily shifted, due to the nature of concessional 
funds (limiting potential supply-side impacts). Hence, for a large majority of African countries—including 
several of the most populous ones—the rise of Chinese finance in recent years has had little apparent 
impact on flows of traditional development finance. Instead, it would seem that Chinese finance is simply 
additional to what is already being supplied by MDBs and traditional bilateral donors—a potentially 
positive result for poorer African countries badly in need of investments, particularly in infrastructure. 
 
In the few more developed non-concessional countries considered in the study, however, Chinese 
financing does appear to be influencing the activities of traditional donors. In particular, overall lending 
volumes by the MDBs shows a strongly significant positive statistical association with Chinese finance 
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levels in these countries—a result that is also extremely robust across a variety of econometric 
specifications. This suggests that in non-concessional countries, the MDBs may be willing to increase 
lending in a competitive fashion. For DAC donors, by contrast, there is no compelling evidence for such 
a competitive behavior. Their limited interest suggests that the MDB reaction should not be driven by 
major stakeholders either. Rather, the MDBs’ own interests in maintaining political influence in these 
countries, which may in turn be instrumental to maintaining their role as important lenders to these 
countries in the medium and long run may be driving this reaction. This could be due to the financial 
incentive MDBs have in lending to non-concessional countries (through the net income generated), or 
because MDB staff and management have an incentive to maintain their own relevance with borrower 
countries, or both.  
 
Overall, it appears that the notion that the huge increase in Chinese finance to Africa is going to re-order 
the development landscape is somewhat overblown, at least on our evidence and in the time period we 
examine (2000-2014). Evidence does suggest that the World Bank and, to a lesser degree, the AfDB, do 
compete with the Chinese in a few non-concessional countries, but this does not seem to be happening 
in the majority of African countries. Furthermore—in contrast to the existing literature—for traditional 
bilateral donors, our evidence for competitive behavior is even less. 
 
It may be the case that MDBs would act similarly in concessional countries, but are unable to do so 
because of the difficulties of concessional resource gathering and allocation. Should concessional 
funding mechanisms change—as has begun to occur at the World Bank with IDA’s new ability to issue 
bonds, and which is being considered at the AfDB—MDBs could become more reactive to Chinese 
activities in concessional countries as well. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that if China becomes 
more active in non-concessional countries, and/or as countries graduate into non-concessional status, 
competition may increase further. Hence, while our findings do not indicate a substantial effect of 
Chinese finance on traditional development actors in Africa up to 2014, the future may be quite different.  
This would thus be an appropriate time for policy makers to consider how they would like traditional 
development agencies to respond to China’s increasing role in global development finance. 
Competition is not necessarily a bad thing—certainly it gives recipient countries more leverage and more 
control over their own development trajectories, which is beneficial for development when governments 
themselves are development oriented and sufficiently well organized. At the same time, competition 
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could lead to inefficient gamesmanship among development financiers in a given countries to “win” 
certain projects, when better results could be achieved through greater coordination and a clear division 
of roles.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Robustness tests for Table 1 
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)    
 
WB  
finance 
AfDB  
finance 
MDB  
finance 
DAC  
finance 
WB 
 finance 
AfDB 
finance 
MDB 
finance 
DAC 
finance    
                     
Chinese finance -0.021 0.053 0.032 -0.124 0.104 0.080 0.173 0.145    
 (0.86) (0.67) (0.88) (0.71) (0.19) (0.46) (0.25) (0.54)    
Non-concessional    31.390 325.148* 397.607* -330.164    
     (0.71) (0.06) (0.06) (0.37)    
Non-concessional*Chinese finance 0.820*** 0.076 0.896* 0.120 0.697*** -0.018 0.619** -0.261    
 (0.00) (0.79) (0.06) (0.87) (0.00) (0.90) (0.01) (0.41)    
GDP per capita 0.026 0.038 0.064 0.029 -0.010 -0.015 -0.030** 0.006    
 (0.42) (0.27) (0.26) (0.75) (0.17) (0.18) (0.04) (0.84)    
Under 5 mortality 0.316 -0.370 -0.053 -2.071 -1.315** -0.893 -2.383** -3.877**    
 (0.83) (0.81) (0.98) (0.62) (0.02) (0.15) (0.02) (0.01)    
Population 17.380 2.915 20.292 68.070 6.135** 7.561* 13.816** 24.154***    
 (0.30) (0.87) (0.50) (0.15) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.00)    
Population squared 0.035 0.013 0.047 -0.394** 0.001 -0.029 -0.028 -0.065    
 (0.59) (0.85) (0.67) (0.03) (0.93) (0.16) (0.35) (0.13)    
Reserves -0.049 -0.034 -0.083 -0.149 -0.090*** -0.103** -0.224** -0.199**    
 (0.54) (0.69) (0.56) (0.50) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)    
Resource rents -1.196 0.927 -0.268 2.871 0.557 -1.002 -0.081 3.695    
 (0.79) (0.84) (0.97) (0.82) (0.83) (0.49) (0.98) (0.59)    
UN voting with US -199.650 -219.723 -419.400 -1,138.357* 25.063 -164.939 -172.513 168.101    
 (0.40) (0.38) (0.32) (0.09) (0.84) (0.60) (0.65) (0.78)    
Political freedom index -34.160 10.914 -23.252 -104.969 1.410 37.850 38.493 -7.568    
 (0.44) (0.82) (0.77) (0.40) (0.89) (0.10) (0.20) (0.85)    
            
Recipient FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO    
Period FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES    
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268    
Number of recipients 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46    
R-squared 0.149 0.027 0.095 0.055 0.364 0.259 0.350 0.277    
Changes as compared to Table1 a. No period FE b. RE-model (with period FE) 
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Table A1: Robustness tests for Table 1 (continued) 
  (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (1d) (2d) (3d) (4d) 
 
lnWB 
finance 
lnAfDB 
finance 
lnMDB 
finance 
lnDAC 
finance 
WB 
 finance 
AfDB  
finance 
MDB  
finance 
DAC 
 finance 
                  
Chinese finance 0.019 -0.122* -0.080 -0.017 0.027 -0.039 -0.013 -0.026 
 (0.77) (0.05) (0.14) (0.59) (0.50) (0.48) (0.86) (0.89) 
Non-concessional*Chinese finance 0.432*** 0.292** 0.529*** 0.083** 1.175 0.134 1.309* 0.105 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04) (0.11) (0.54) (0.10) (0.63) 
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.014 0.063 0.076 0.072 
 (0.90) (0.08) (0.04) (0.37) (0.48) (0.12) (0.14) (0.32) 
Under 5 mortality -0.013 -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.009* 0.965 1.981 2.947 -3.214 
 (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.21) (0.20) (0.13) (0.22) 
Population -0.034 -0.064 -0.085 -0.062 22.838* 23.036 45.873 80.581** 
 (0.58) (0.42) (0.22) (0.14) (0.05) (0.29) (0.12) (0.01) 
Population squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.032 -0.040 -0.409*** 
 (0.84) (0.31) (0.31) (0.22) (0.85) (0.59) (0.65) (0.00) 
Reserves -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.008 -0.006 -0.014 -0.115 
 (0.09) (0.61) (0.72) (0.99) (0.88) (0.95) (0.92) (0.13) 
Resource rents -0.069*** 0.000 -0.041*** -0.005 -3.672** 0.540 -3.132 -1.352 
 (0.00) (0.98) (0.01) (0.48) (0.03) (0.82) (0.31) (0.86) 
UN voting with US -0.683 -0.894 -1.184 0.241 101.149 -23.050 78.066 -672.333 
 (0.70) (0.52) (0.41) (0.72) (0.48) (0.94) (0.85) (0.22) 
Political freedom index -0.308 -0.433 -0.310 -0.110 -39.938*** -2.172 -42.107 -87.065* 
 (0.21) (0.18) (0.14) (0.19) (0.01) (0.92) (0.17) (0.09) 
             
Recipient FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 268 268 268 268 489 489 489 489 
Number of recipients 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
R-squared 0.208 0.104 0.209 0.243 0.323 0.107 0.224 0.084 
Changes as compared to Table1 c. All funding variables in logs  
(including Chinese finance) 
d. Periods are years rather than bi-annual. 
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Table A1: Robustness tests for Table 1 (continued) 
  (1e) (2e) (3e) (4e) (1f) (2f) (3f) (4f)   
 
WB  
finance 
AfDB 
 finance 
MDB 
 finance 
DAC 
 finance 
WB 
 finance 
AfDB 
finance 
MDB 
 finance 
DAC 
 finance   
                    
Chinese finance -0.022 0.006 -0.010 0.042 0.058 0.091 0.092 0.065   
 (0.45) (0.87) (0.66) (0.39) (0.62) (0.50) (0.64) (0.81)   
    -132.869    299.498 160.280 -408.345  
     (0.44) (0.19) (0.60) (0.27)   
Non-concessional*Chinese finance 0.378*** 0.204** 0.263*** -0.006 0.962*** 0.088 0.959** -0.128   
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.94) (0.00) (0.80) (0.05) (0.85)   
GDP per capita -0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 -0.009 -0.027 -0.021 0.013   
 (0.66) (0.02) (0.39) (0.65) (0.59) (0.25) (0.51) (0.73)   
Under 5 mortality -0.000 -0.039*** -0.015 -0.006 -1.722** -1.613 -2.408 -3.525*   
 (0.97) (0.00) (0.11) (0.37) (0.04) (0.14) (0.11) (0.06)   
Population -0.008 -0.111 -0.047 0.017 7.225*** 9.104** 13.073*** 25.553***   
 (0.91) (0.16) (0.50) (0.66) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)   
Population squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.034 -0.015 -0.079*   
 (0.56) (0.22) (0.39) (0.21) (0.93) (0.22) (0.69) (0.09)   
Reserves -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.364** -0.205* -0.365** -0.181   
 (0.30) (0.40) (0.28) (0.44) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.26)   
Resource rents -0.013 -0.021 -0.017 0.002 -0.688 0.550 -1.431 3.397   
 (0.40) (0.58) (0.38) (0.91) (0.79) (0.87) (0.75) (0.55)   
UN voting with US -1.117 0.769 -0.526 -1.519 -105.303 -301.787 -365.068 3.793   
 (0.20) (0.53) (0.60) (0.26) (0.72) (0.42) (0.48) (1.00)   
Political freedom index -0.134 0.323 0.056 -0.104 1.360 30.881 32.423 -8.543   
 (0.39) (0.11) (0.64) (0.19) (0.95) (0.28) (0.39) (0.85)   
           
Recipient FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO   
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Observations 260 266 267 268 268 268 268 268   
Number of recipients 44 44 45 46 46 46 46 46   
R-squared (e) / Chi-squared (f) 0.671 0.880 0.790 0.636 111.3 39.15 80.55 76.87   
Changes as compared to Table1 e. PPML-model, Chinese finance transformed in 
logs so that relevant coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities (comparable to c.) 
f. Tobit RE-model (with period FE); left censored 
observations: WB 62, AfDB 71, MDB 35, DAC 0. 
 
Notes: Dependent variables always refer to the year preceding the period considered for the explanatory variables and controls. *,**,and *** show significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively; 
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by recipients. R-squared refers to the within R-squared except for the RE-model (b) where it refers to the overall R-squared.  
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Table A2: Full equations and robustness tests for sector allocation to infrastructure (main results of Table 2) 
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
 WB infra AfDB infra MDB infra DAC infra WB infra AfDB infra MDB infra DAC infra 
                  
% Chinese -0.170 -0.210 -0.157 0.024 -0.279 -0.126 -0.170 0.048 
 (0.34) (0.24) (0.46) (0.67) (0.19) (0.48) (0.46) (0.35) 
Non-concessional            
             
Non-concessional*% Chinese 0.454 -1.445*** -0.518 0.213 0.592* -1.310** -0.335 0.225 
 (0.21) (0.01) (0.31) (0.31) (0.09) (0.01) (0.53) (0.36) 
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.008** -0.003 0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.000 0.005** 
 (0.94) (0.03) (0.35) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.98) (0.03) 
Under 5 mortality 0.064 0.182 -0.071 0.057 -0.247* -0.106 -0.311*** 0.000 
 (0.78) (0.48) (0.72) (0.37) (0.08) (0.59) (0.01) (0.99) 
Population -1.414 2.342 0.077 -0.113 -0.812 2.785 0.278 -0.016 
 (0.35) (0.24) (0.95) (0.82) (0.56) (0.17) (0.80) (0.97) 
Population squared 0.005 -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.008 0.000 0.000 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.81) (0.70) (0.54) (0.18) (0.99) (0.86) 
Reserves 0.014 -0.030** -0.029** -0.011*** 0.002 -0.022** -0.024** -0.010*** 
 (0.48) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.93) (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) 
Resource rents 0.418 0.030 0.669 -0.126 0.584* 0.425 0.889** -0.090 
 (0.21) (0.95) (0.11) (0.34) (0.06) (0.44) (0.04) (0.54) 
UN voting with US -24.733 87.727** 14.611 15.793 -28.973 54.724* -11.931 17.597*** 
 (0.52) (0.01) (0.61) (0.24) (0.23) (0.07) (0.62) (0.00) 
Political freedom index 1.888 -3.032 2.585 -4.432*** 1.578 -5.179 1.064 -4.321*** 
 (0.70) (0.50) (0.54) (0.00) (0.75) (0.26) (0.80) (0.00) 
             
Observations 225 232 248 268 225 232 248 268 
Number of recipients 44 45 45 46 44 45 45 46 
R-squared 0.182 0.179 0.147 0.258 0.066 0.122 0.100 0.244 
Changes as compared to Table 2 a. No change, full regression for infrastructure finance b. No period FE 
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Table A2: Full equations and robustness tests for sector allocation to infrastructure (Table A2 continued) 
  (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (1d) (2d) (3d) (4d) 
 WB infra AfDB infra MDB infra DAC infra WB infra AfDB infra MDB infra DAC infra 
                  
% Chinese -0.233 -0.203 -0.177 -0.004 -0.038 -0.125 -0.170 -0.011 
 (0.20) (0.33) (0.36) (0.95) (0.82) (0.44) (0.18) (0.80) 
Non-concessional -11.243 -4.746 7.866 2.233     
 (0.49) (0.70) (0.62) (0.84)     
Non-concessional*% Chinese 0.455 -0.239 -0.153 0.060 0.383 -0.467 0.162 -0.423*** 
 (0.24) (0.68) (0.73) (0.78) (0.42) (0.14) (0.49) (0.00) 
GDP per capita -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.011** -0.003 0.001 
 (0.97) (0.55) (0.91) (0.26) (0.67) (0.02) (0.39) (0.57) 
Under 5 mortality -0.037 -0.121* -0.047 -0.029 -0.022 0.006 -0.113 0.041 
 (0.61) (0.08) (0.51) (0.42) (0.93) (0.98) (0.55) (0.50) 
Population 0.312 0.339 0.142 0.139 -0.170 1.549 0.782 0.422 
 (0.26) (0.16) (0.51) (0.27) (0.92) (0.46) (0.63) (0.48) 
Population squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.36) (0.19) (0.68) (0.32) (0.96) (0.52) (0.73) (0.50) 
Reserves 0.036*** 0.003 0.002 -0.011*** 0.012 -0.016* -0.012** -0.012*** 
 (0.00) (0.84) (0.88) (0.00) (0.49) (0.07) (0.04) (0.00) 
Resource rents 0.117 -0.026 0.119 -0.049 -0.043 0.647 0.801*** 0.083 
 (0.69) (0.90) (0.65) (0.62) (0.89) (0.12) (0.00) (0.47) 
UN voting with US -7.348 39.122 16.940 4.443 -0.277 -5.264 -10.085 4.796 
 (0.82) (0.26) (0.57) (0.67) (0.99) (0.87) (0.63) (0.42) 
Political freedom index 3.876** 1.087 1.728 -1.086   -5.364 0.178 -4.357*** 
 (0.04) (0.64) (0.42) (0.28)   (0.19) (0.97) (0.00) 
             
Observations 225 232 248 268 367 364 421 489 
Number of recipients 44 45 45 46 0.106 0.136 0.103 0.198 
R-squared 0.215 0.117 0.124 0.315 42 44 44 46 
Changes as compared to Table 2 c. RE-model (with period FE) d. Periods are years rather than bi-annual. 
Notes: Dependent variables always refer to the year preceding the period considered for the explanatory variables and controls. *,**,and *** show significance at the 10, 5, and 
1% level respectively; p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by recipients. R-squared refers to the within R-squared except for the RE-model (c) where it refers to 
the overall R-squared.  
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Table A3: Variable description and sources 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description Sources 
WB finance 735 155.07 289.95 0 4008 World Bank concessional and non-concessional 
combined 
World Bank 
(2000-2014) 
AfDB finance 735 108.81 314.33 0 5437.2 AfDB concessional and non-concessional AfDB (2000-
2009, 2010-
2014) 
MDB finance 735 263.88 512.82 0 7740.5 World Bank and African DB, concessional and 
non-concessional combined 
 
DAC finance 735 530.02 812.63 3.3 13374.1 DAC bilateral donors, ODA and OOF combined OECD (2017a) 
Chinese finance 735 115.63 367.17 0 3779.8 Chinese official finance, no information on ODA 
vs. OOF, nominal figures adjusted for inflation 
with 2013 US Consumer Price Index.  
AidData 
(Dreher et al., 
2017) 
% Chinese 735 9.29 18.47 0 94.67 % of Chinese lending in total (MDBs + DAC + 
Chinese) 
 
WB infra 526 29.89 33.51 0 100 % of infrastructure lending in total WB lending  
AfDB infra 527 39.94 41.33 0 100 % of infrastructure lending in total AFDB 
lending 
 
MDB infra 606 34.48 32.38 0 100 % of infrastructure lending in total MDB lending  
DAC infra 735 11.15 14.60 0 90.36 % of infrastructure lending in total DAC ODA  
WB social 526 18.27 28.15 0 100 % of social lending in total WB lending  
AfDB social 527 12.89 28.72 0 176.92 % of social lending in total AFDB lending  
MDB social 606 16.47 24.89 0 107.89 % of social lending in total MDB lending  
DAC social 735 34.17 19.54 1.22 93.47 % of social lending in total DAC finance  
WB budget 526 27.11 33.30 0 100 % of budget lending in total WB lending  
AfDB budget 527 25.05 36.05 0 100 % of budget lending in total AFDB lending  
MDB budget 606 26.17 30.67 0 100 % of budget lending in total MDB lending  
DAC budget 735 4.43 9.15 0 73.14 % of budget lending in total DAC finance  
Non-
concessional 
735 0.24 0.43 0 1 Recipient not eligible for concessional funding 
by IDA and AfDF 
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Table A3: Variable description and sources (continued) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description Sources 
GDP per capita 732 4674.551 5939.911 503.8321 40015.82 GDP per capita, PPP, 2011 intl. $ World Bank (2017a) 
Under 5 mortality 735 98.08 47.68 13.8 235.8 Probability per 1000 that a 
newborn baby will die before 
reaching age five 
World Bank (2017a) 
Population 732 18.53 26.96 0.08 176.46 Population in millions World Bank (2017a) 
Reserves 559 118.82 402.15 0.01 3840.12 Ratio of hard currency reserves to 
external debt, in % 
World Bank (2017a) 
Resource_rents 727 13.29 13.71 0.001 89.17 Resource rents in % of GDP World Bank (2017a) 
UN voting with US 637 0.34 0.13 0 0.7 Alignment on important votes Kilby (2011, 
updated) 
Political Freedom Index 735 4.23 1.52 1 7 Political freedom, 
1=best,…,7=worst 
Freedom House 
(2017) 
Notes: Descriptive statistics refer to the annual data. No sources are mentioned for composed variables computed from data for which the sources have already been provided. 
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Table A4: List of interviews 
Ethiopia (October 12-14, 2016) 
Fisseha Aberra, Director, International Financial Institutions Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of Finance 
Dr. Tesfaye Alemu, Director, Debt Management Directorate, Ministry of Finance 
Tilahun Tadesse, Head, Ethio-Chinese Development Cooperation Office, Ministry of Finance 
Tesfaye Berhanu, Coordinator, Regional Trade Programs, Ministry of Finance 
Daniel Mengestie, Director, Planning and Program Management Directorate, Ethiopian Roads Authority 
Seifu Feyissa, External Funds Coordinator, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation 
 
Tanzania (October 17-21, 2016) 
Adrian Njau, Assistant Commissioner, Aid Coordination, External Finance Commission, Ministry of Finance 
John Mavura, Desk Officer, World Bank, External Finance Commission, Ministry of Finance  
Ngosha Magonya, Commissioner, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (former Commissioner for External Finance, Ministry of Finance) 
Deckland Mhaiki, Deputy Managing Director (Investments), Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) 
Aunyisa Boniface Meena, Assistant Director, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication 
 
Malawi (October 24-27, 2016) 
Dr. Ronald Mangani, Treasury Secretary, Ministry of Finance 
Madalo Nyambose, Director for Debt and Aid Management, Ministry of Finance 
Betty Ngoma, Assistant Director for Debt and Aid Management, Ministry of Finance 
Naomi Ngwira, Deputy Governor, Malawi Central Bank (former Director of Debt and Aid Management, Ministry of Finance) 
Allan Kaziputa, Project Planning, National Roads Authority 
